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ADEQUATE PSYCHIATRIC
TREATMENT-A
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT?*
"The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is
treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment. This is the only
justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil commit-
ments to mental institutions ..
INTRODUCTION
For one out of every ten Americans now alive' involuntary psychiatric
confinement is a very real and threatening possibility. In fact, admissions
to mental institutions have doubled over the last 15 years. Mental patients
outnumber prisoners by approximately three to one and occupy more hos-
pital beds than all other kinds of patients. While approximately 350,000
mental patients are cared for by private hospitals, veteran's hospitals, and
psychiatric wards of general hospitals, nearly 400,000 of the three-quarter
of a million mental patients in this country are confined in state or county
mental facilities.' However, even more terrifying than the statistical odds
relating to psychiatric confinement is the fact that a majority of those
committed are simply forgotten, receiving custodial care with little or no
attempt made at rehabilitation.4 Legal and medical help is needed for this
invisible segment of society.
This pattern of neglect flows from the mistaken premise that there is
* The St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (emphasis in original).
2 B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY at vii (1972) [hereinafter cited as ENNIS].
These statistics were compiled in 1972. At that time it was predicted that the number of
patients in mental hospitals would increase to one and a half million within the next year.
ENNIS, supra note 2, at vii.
This paper deals primarily with the right of involuntary mental patients to receive treatment.
On the basis of the recent statement of the New York Court of Appeals in In re Buttonow, 23
N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968), that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that voluntary patients be given all the rights that involun-
tary patients are accorded by statute, it might well be argued that the rights espoused here
for involuntary patients are also applicable to voluntary patients.
I Florida State Hospital in Florida and Bryce State Hospital in Alabama have been referred
to as human warehouses where treatment is nonexistent. These institutions are far from being
exceptional; "[hiundreds like [them] can be found all over the country." ENNIS, supra note
2, at 99.
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no alternative to involuntary hospitalization and from the belief that the
rights of those hospitalized have been satisfactorily safeguarded during the
commitment process. Any attempt to formulate remedial programs must
begin with an analysis of the theoretical basis for committing persons to
mental institutions. Two well established principles often relied on as jus-
tification for involuntary commitment of the mentally ill' are the role of
the state as parens patriae, and the power and duty of the state to preserve
the safety of its citizens.6 The concept of parens patriae suggests that the
state as guardian over the disabled is allowed and even required to institu-
tionalize mentally ill people who are in need of treatment. It is hypothes-
ized that these people are infirm and cannot recognize their need for treat-
ment. The idea of the guardian protecting the weak individual is but-
tressed by the argument that the state must exercise its police power to
protect society. This analysis justifies the institutionalization of those
mentally ill persons who are deemed to be potentially dangerous to them-
selves or to others.7
Mental illness is defined as "an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which
is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such
an extent that the person afflicted requires care and treatment." N.Y. MENT. HYG. L.
§ 1.05(17) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
This paper will not discuss the right to treatment of geriatric patients and mentally retarded
patients. These two classes suffer from mental disorders that stem from physiological imbal-
ances. Treatment could at best teach these patients to cope with their disorders while a total
cure is presently beyond hope. One court has stated:
The evidence is without dispute that these patients are not properly confined [in an
institution geared to rehabilitate the mentally ill] since these ...patients cannot
benefit from any psychiatric treatment or are not mentally ill.
This paper deals with the plight of those patients who suffer from "curable" mental disorders.
Their treatment is hopefully directed toward an eventual release from the institution in which
they are confined. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment-A Constitutional Right to Treatment, 23 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 125, 127 (1972).
7 A determination as to whether or not a person is "dangerous" is often more a function of
the examining psychiatrist's analysis or, in some cases, whim, than of a well defined statutory
term:
The statutes authorize preventive incarceration of mentally ill persons who are likely
to injure themselves or others. Generally, 'injure' is not further defined in the statutes
or in the case law, and the critical decision whether a predicted pattern of behavior is
sufficiently injurious to warrant incarceration-is relegated to the psychiatrist's unar-
ticulated judgments. . . .One psychiatrist recently told a meeting of the American
Psychiatric Association that "you"-the psychiatrists-" have to define for yourself the
word danger, and then having decided that in your mind . ..look for it with every
conceivable means. .. "
Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife Cuts Both Ways,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, February 1969, at 44-46 [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz]. New York
State has, however, taken affirmative steps to alter this situation by providing some valuable
standards in its revised Mental Hygiene Law. Dangerousness of a prospective patient is
equated with "likelihood of serious harm" which is defined as:
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The persuasiveness of these principles and the legitimacy of involun-
tary hospitalization has been seriously questioned on both philosophical
and practical grounds. The role of the state as parens patriae in helping
those who are in need of treatment has been attacked as contrary to an
essential premise of liberty:"
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs,
or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own
health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers
by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compel-
ling each to live as seems good to the rest.
Society grants token recognition to this principle by permitting people to
smoke although it is medically agreed that smoking shortens lives. By
allowing a patient in a general hospital to refuse surgery although it may
save his life the state explicitly recognizes that he is the "proper guardian
of his own health." However, once a person is adjudged mentally ill, he is
no longer permitted to make the decisions that affect his life. The individ-
ual's self direction is sacrificed to the paternalistic assumption that a
mentally ill person, if he were sane, would choose for himself precisely what
the committing physicians say he should choose, i.e., treatment and care
in a state mental institution.
This assumption is possibly erroneous. Even if it is hypothesized that
a prospective patient would receive treatment to improve his mental con-
dition, he might realistically fear the stigma attached to confinement in
an institution, a stigma which has, in fact, cost many patients valuable
employment and educational opportunities. Furthermore, the prospective
patient might justifiedly fear the anti-therapeutic affects of prolonged in-
voluntary hospitalization. One intensive study has concluded:
The depressing surroundings, the idleness, the loss of ordinary privileges, the
isolation from family, friends and developments in the outside world-these
and many other aspects of institutional life, which are almost inherent char-
acteristics of state hospitals, lead to a loss of motivation, to withdrawal and
regression, and to apathy, submissiveness and an inability to make decisions.
In short, hospitalization itself produces a distinct functional pathology, ap-
propriately dubbed 'institutional neurosis."
(1) substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at
suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself,
or
(2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other
violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear or serious physical harm.
N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 31.37(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
T. SzAsZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 116 (1970). See also ENNIS, supra note 2, at 224-28.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (1859).
" Wexler & Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in
Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 237-38 (1971).
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It is paradoxical that the concept of parens patriae should be used to
justify the permanent neglect of the mentally ill. The sweeping use of the
state's police power against the mentally ill on the grounds that they are
dangerous to themselves or to others, has also been attacked." One critic
has noted that most mental patients are unable to organize their lives and
assert themselves. Such a characteristic, he argues, makes them "less dan-
gerous than the 'average' citizen." As proof of his assertion, he points out
"the New York study showing that over a five-year period the arrest rate
of 5,000 former patients, all adult males, was less than one-twelfth the rate
for the community at large; the rate for serious crimes was even lower.' ' 2
However, it must be conceded that a small minority of the mentally ill are,
in fact, dangerous individuals. Despite this fact, society must ask itself
why it chooses preventive detention only for these persons while it jealously
protects the liberty of a criminal who has finished his prison term without
any showing of rehabilitation. It would shock our sense of justice to assume
without proof that an ex-convict will necessarily commit a further criminal
act and should therefore be protectively detained. However, our sensitivi-
ties are not confronted with this disturbing comparison because it is fur-
ther argued that a mentally ill person (i.e., one who, in the uncertain
opinion of medical experts, is dangerous to himself or others) is confined
not merely to protect society but also to help him adjust to reality through
therapy and treatment. Such a rationalization is weakened if not destroyed
by the hard fact that prolonged stay in a state mental hospital often causes
psychiatric deterioration. Parens patriae is most persuasively used to sup-
port the logical necessity for confining those who are unable to attend to
their own basic needs.
It is a virtual certainty that our courts will not question the per se
legitimacy of involuntary institutional commitment. 3 However, some state
legislatures have instituted fundamental reforms limiting the scope of such
commitments. The California experience, in particular, serves as a model
for the future. Legislation has been enacted directing that only persons
who are presently demonstrably dangerous to themselves or others are
subject to involuntary commitment." Presumptive time limits placed
* See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 7, at 43.
2 ENNIS, supra note 2, at 225.
'* Even those courts that have elected to inquire into the validity of individual confinements
have not challenged the per se validity of involuntary commitment. See, e.g., Lake v. Camer-
on, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), which held that involuntary commitment should be
ordered only if no suitable but less drastic alternatives could be found. See also, Chambers,
Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972). Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
and Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), have applied a similar rationale
to the examination of living conditions after a patient is committed. In Wyatt, Judge Johnson
recognized that "patients have a right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve
the purposes of commitment." 344 F. Supp. at 379.
" CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. § 5150 (West. 1972).
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upon involuntary hospitalizations- 14 days for persons who are suicidal
and 90 days for those who are homicidal or assaultive-ensures that pa-
tients will be quickly returned to their communities.' 5 The non-dangerous
mentally ill are treated in neighborhood clinics.
The results of these reforms are encouraging. The average period of
hospitalization has been reduced, as has the rehospitalization rate and the
incidence of suicide or anti-social behavior by discharged patients.'" Other
legislatures should carefully study California's reforms with a view toward
reconstructing their own outmoded mental health laws.
While no court has or is likely to challenge the state's power to confine
the mentally ill," a landmark federal decision, Wyatt v. Stickney,'5 has
ameliorated some of the consequences of confinement in a mental institu-
tion. The Alabama district court declared that a mental patient has a
constitutional right to treatment and set forth minimum standards for the
creation of a humane psychological and physical environment. The Wyatt
decision declared that patients have a right to have visitors, to attend
religious services, to wear their own clothes, to exercise physically several
times weekly, to be outdoors regularly, to interact with members of the
opposite sex, to receive nutritionally adequate meals, to receive minimum
compensation for work performed, and to have a residence unit with
screens or curtains to insure privacy.' This article will trace the develop-
ment of the right to treatment, consider various means for its enforcement
in light of Wyatt and discuss the emerging concept of the right to refuse
treatment.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
In 1960, Morton Birnbaum, a lawyer and a psychiatrist, was the first
to suggest that an involuntary mental patient had a right to receive proper
psychiatric treatment. 2" Birnbaum reasoned that since most mental pa-
tients are committed in civil proceedings under statutes promising treat-
ment,2' if a patient is not in fact given adequate treatment, his confine-
Id., § 5300 (West 1972).
6 ENNIS, supra note 2, at 223.
' See note 13 supra.
' 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
' Id. at 379-83. The court also stated that the patients were to be protected from non-
therapeutic labor, from excessive restraints and isolation, from experimental research, lobo-
tomies, and shock treatments without informed consent.
11 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Birn-
baum].
21 A statutory right to treatment is recognized in many states. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE ANN. § 6002 (West 1972); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-344 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
911/2, § 12-2, 100-7 (West 1966); IOWA CODE § 225.15 (West 1969); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 202.840
(West 1972);N.M. STAT. § 34-2-13 (1953); N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 15.03(2) (McKinney Supp.
1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (1953).
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ment becomes equivalent to penal incarceration." Therefore, Birnbaum
argued, adequate psychiatric treatment must be provided to justify the
commitment under substantive due process guidelines. 3 While a number
of cases24 preceding Birnbaum's formulation also sought to protect the
rights of mental patients, his commentary was the first to set forth a
rationale for requiring treatment.
Although not mentioned by name, Birnbaum's theory was given judi-
cial support in Ragsdale v. Overholser.15 Ragsdale had been acquitted of
robbery charges on grounds of insanity and confined to a mental institu-
tion. His petition for habeas corpus was dismissed in federal district
court;26 and the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. The majority opinion declared that Ragsdale's case
history was sufficient to support a finding that he was dangerous and not
suitable for release.2 7 However, Judge Fahy's concurring opinion inter-
preted a District of Columbia statute2" requiring mandatory commitment
following a plea of not guilty as presupposing "that treatment will be
accorded."2 This opinion was the first judicial support given to the Birn-
baum theory.
Six years later in Rouse v. Cameron,3 Judge Bazelon wrote the major-
ity opinion recognizing the right to treatment .3 Like Ragsdale, Rouse had
been acquitted on a criminal charge on a finding of insanity and subse-
quently involuntarily committed. The federal district court, arguing that
it only had jurisdiction to inquire into whether or not Rouse had regained
his sanity, refused to consider his contention that he had not received
treatment following his confinement."2 However, the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that the statute created a right to treatment and thereby
2 Such confinement is not supported by the traditional justification for the lack of a defi-
nitely stipulated time period in psychiatric costs cases. The justification has been explained
as follows: "Hospitalization ... bears no relation to a jail sentence. A jail sentence is puni-
tive and is to be imposed by the judge within the limits set by the legislature. Hospitalization
is remedial and its limits are determined by the condition to be treated." Overholser v. Lynch,
288 F.2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
13 Birnbaum, supra note 20, at 503.
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Page, 330 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959), wherein the court,
interpreting a state statute requiring the custody and treatment of the mentally ill, ruled that
absent such treatment mere custodial care would be an unconstitutional application of the
statute. For a discussion of other pre-Birnbaum cases dealing with the right to treatment,
see Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 587,
588 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Drake].
25 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
26 Id.
2 Id. at 945-46.
2 D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA § 24-301 (West 1967).
2 281 F.2d at 950.
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059, 1061 (1972).
373 F.2d at 452.
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raised the question whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy to en-
force this right. Judge Bazelon recognized the need to insure that treat-
ment be adequate for those persons whose commitment is without proce-
dural due process safeguards.3 3 He went on to assert: "One who is in cus-
tody 'in violation of the Constitution and laws' of the United States is
entitled to relief in habeas corpus, and the court is required to 'dispose of
the matter as law and justice requires'."34 However, the decision avoided
the question of a constitutional right to treatment, noting, "[b]ecause we
hold that the statutory right to treatment provision applies to appellant,
we need not resolve the serious constitutional questions. . . . 3
Rouse and numerous subsequent decisions 3 enforced a statutory right
to treatment where one existed, but the courts avoided deciding whether
a mental patient's right to treatment was constitutionally mandated in the
absence of state statutes.
Wyatt v. Stickney7 found such a mandate. A class action3 8 comm-
enced in federal district court by the guardians of all mental patients
confined to Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, sought to enjoin the
State Department of Mental Health from reducing the number of profes-
sional personnel and from instituting an experimental treatment program.
Although an injunction was not issued, the court ordered that proper stan-
dards for adequate treatment be both promulgated and implemented
within six months time.3 9 Since there was no state statute at issue the court
33
Many of those detained in institutions today were put away with little ceremony or
under standards grossly vague in meaning. Lengthy civil commitment often results
from a brief and informal hearing before one or more psychiatrists. Rouse's commit-
ment, for example, was automatic after the judge concluded there was reasonable
doubt of his sanity at the time he had committed the criminal acts charged; there was
no hearing on the issues of his continued dangerousness or treatability.
Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 100 (1967).
When a case is presented to a court by writ of habeas corpus, the court is limited to protecting
the right to treatment of one or only a handful of patients. The Wyatt plaintiffs, by virtue of
a class action seeking an injunction against the Department of Mental Health of the State of
Alabama, brought an entire mental hospital under judicial inspection. The use of this type
of action served to protect the constitutional rights of over 500 patients. In addition to habeas
corpus relief and class action suits, other remedies commonly sought to protect or enforce the
rights of mental patients are: money damages for a failure to provide statutorily and constitu-
tionally required treatment; money damages for false imprisonment; and writs of mandamus
to require treatment. See Drake, supra note 24, at 598-600.
373 F.2d at 458, quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2243 (1970).
Id. at 455.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 847 (1969); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Nason v. Superintend-
ent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
37 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See text accompanying note 47 infra.
I Id. at 782. The use of a class action by the plaintiffs in Wyatt was unique and laudable.
Most prior cases sought habeas corpus relief.
3, 325 F. Supp. at 785.
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based its order on the patients' constitutional right to treatment. The
court's reasoning seemed to echo Birnbaum's theory formulated more than
a decade earlier: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons
and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamen-
tals of due process.
' '
40
Understanding of the protection afforded by a constitutional right to
treatment may be furthered if the following questions are answered: What
is the theoretical basis for declaring the existence of such a right? If treat-
ment is denied due to inadequate funding of mental health facilities, does
the Constitution empower the courts to compel legislatures to provide for
satisfactory treatment. Finally, granting that there is a constitutional right
to such treatment is there a correlative duty to submit to such treatment?
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE TREATMENT
The Wyatt court, the first to determine that mental patients have a
constitutional right to adequate treatment,4' stated without explanation
that due process was the basis for this right. The Rouse court, although
basing the decision on statutory rights, suggested, in dicta, numerous con-
stitutional grounds to support the right to treatment, i.e., equal protection
of the laws, substantive due process, and the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. 42 These cases, when read together, begin to crystal-
lize the reasoning behind a claim of constitutional right. However, it is
necessary to explore further to determine which constitutional foundation
best supports the right to treatment.
Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process of law, guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, has traditionally required only that a rational basis exist for
a given legislative enactment.4 3 The courts have recently adopted a func-
tional due process approach which frames the issue in these terms: Does a
statute having a proper legislative purpose provide real and substantial
means for achieving that end?44
40 Id.
41 Id.
12 373 F.2d at 453:
[A] failure to supply treatment may raise a question of due process of law. It has been
suggested that a failure to supply treatment may violate the equal protection clause.
Indefinite confinement without treatment of one who has been found not criminally
responsible may be so inhumane as to be a 'cruel and unusual punishment.'
See Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960); Commonwealth v.
Page, 339 Mass. 313, 317, 318, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959).
" See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The case holds that involuntary civil
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Mentally ill people are involuntarily hospitalized, under state stat-
utes, for therapeutic reasons." Compulsory hospitalization for rehabilita-
tion purposes is deemed a proper goal of state legislation." If, however,
treatment is then denied, the statutory means, compulsory hospitaliza-
tion, neither achieves nor is justified by the purported purpose of rehabili-
tation. Chief Judge Johnson stated in Wyatt: "When patients are .. .
committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitu-
tional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them
a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condi-
tion."4 Birnbaum's theoretical proposition that there is a right to treat-
ment and the Wyatt court's articulation of its constitutional basis were
framed in terms of substantive due process. The argument is relatively
simple: if a statute commits mentally ill people under promise of treat-
ment, then such treatment must be forthcoming or the statute cannot be
upheld. If there is no longer legal basis for holding him, the confined
individual who has been denied treatment can be released for just such a
denial. Judge Bazelon, commented, "unconditional or conditional release
may be in order if it appears that the opportunity for treatment has been
exhausted."4" He went on to formulate four criteria that should be consid-
ered when such a release is contemplated: the amount of time during which
the patient has been denied treatment; the length of time the patient has
been confined; the nature of the patient's mental condition; and the degree
of danger that would be imposed on society if the patient were released.49
Therefore, under a combination of conditions meeting these criteria, a
patient denied his substantive due process rights should win release. 50
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Perhaps the most compelling articulation of a constitutional right to
treatment is found in terms of the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. Society is constantly defining and redefin-
ing the meaning and purpose of punishment for criminal activities. ' Pun-
commitment for rehabilitation can only be justified as a proper legislative purpose if its goal
is therapy.
' See note 21 supra.
' Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
" Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
373 F.2d at 458-59.
Id. at 458.
"' For a contrary opinion, see People ex rel. Anonymous v. LaBurt, 14 App. Div. 2d 560, 218
N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 738, 217 N.E.2d 31, 270 N.Y.S.2d 206, cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 428 (1962), which held that a denial of substantive due process for a patient
committed for treatment purposes "does not confer on the mentally ill person a right to
release in the event of claimed inadequate treatment." 14 App. Div. 2d at 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d
at 739.
1' Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) stated: "The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
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ishment is generally sanctioned for four reasons: retribution, deterrence,
protection of society, and rehabilitation. Certainly, the threat of confine-
ment will not deter mental illness. It follows that, if a person has not
committed a crime, his confinement cannot be justified as a retributory
measure. If a person is not considered dangerous, 52 his confinement cannot
be approved for the protection of society. And if a person is adjudged to
be in need of treatment and is then denied it, it is highly questionable
whether his incarceration can be deemed rehabilitative. In short, absent a
need or provision for retribution, deterrence, protection of society, or reha-
bilitation, any confinement is cruel and unusual punishment. It can well
be argued that this is precisely the situation of most mental patients whose
confinement denies them treatment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California53 provides a
basis for applying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
to mental patients confined without treatment. The Court struck down a
statute that made narcotics addiction a misdemeanor punishable by im-
prisonment. It held that imprisoning a person who has not engaged in
criminal activity but who is merely "guilty" of belonging to a class-such
as drug addicts-is cruel and unusual punishment.54 The mental patient
denied rehabilitative therapy is being treated even more unjustly than
Robinson. A drug addict who is imprisoned solely because he.is an addict
is being subjected to punishment for his status. The addict, however, has
in all probability caused his addiction by his voluntary and criminal acts.
Mental illness, unlike addiction, lacks the elements of either voluntary
initiation or criminality. Confinement of a mentally ill person under these
circumstances is equivalent to punishment, and any punishment in the
absence of criminal activities must be deemed cruel and unusual.
In Furman v. Georgia5 1 the Supreme Court failed to articulate a simple
comprehensive eighth amendment test. Nonetheless, Mr. Justice Brennan,
in the most persuasive of the five majority opinions, has indicated there is
an ultimate determinate-the basic premise of the eighth amendment is
that punishment is cruel and unusual if it is "degrading to human dign-
ity." '6 Confinement of the mentally ill without treatment would by this
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so-
ciety."
52 Less than 5% of mental patients are considered dangerous to themselves or to others. ENNIS,
supra note 2, at viii.
5 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
1 Id. at 666. See Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), which expanded the
protection against cruel and unusual punishment to chronic alcoholics who, because of their
disease, were categorized as criminals and imprisoned.
408 U.S. 238 (1972); see Note, Deathknell for Capital Punishment? 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
107 (1972).
" Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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measure be cruel and unusual punishment."
Judge Morris E. Lasker, a federal district court judge for the Southern
District of New York has, in a series of cases, enumerated three considera-
tions useful in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual: (1)
the reasonableness of the punishment and its effect on the recipient; 5 (2)
whether the punishment outweighs the offense;59 and (3) whether the pun-
ishment conflicts with the "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civi-
lized standards, humanity, and decency."60 Under all three guidelines,
confinement of mental patients coupled with a denial of therapy is cruel
and unusual punishment. As to the first test, the Second Circuit, in United
States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold,"1 said, "prolonged commitment in an
institution providing only custodial confinement for the 'mentally sick'
and nothing more may itself cause serious psychological harm or exacer-
bate any pre-existing conditions."' ' The second test also establishes that
punishment of the mentally ill is cruel and unusual for any punishment
will necessarily outweigh the "offense" of being mentally ill. Finally, under
the third test, the answer to the question whether a "civilized society"
would punish its sick appears self-evident.
Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment suggests an
alternative though speculative framework for a constitutional right to
treatment. Equal protection requires that there be equality of treatment
within a class of people.6 3 It has been argued that one such classification
is "ill people"-be they physically or mentally ill.14 Physically ill people
certainly cannot be imprisoned for their condition, and, except for rare
instances where contagion threatens, cannot be forcibly hospitalized. 5
11 See Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic
Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 513, 531-33 (1973).
11 Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This case related to the confine-
ment of a "political prisoner," Angela Davis, in solitary facilities pending her extradition
upon kidnapping and homicide charges.
"' Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 328 F. Supp. 473 (1971). This case questioned the constitutionality of solitary
confinement as it is administered to juvenile offenders.
' Id., quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
" 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 1079.
" See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). This case stated that a statute
requiring habitual criminals to be sterilized must be applicable to all habitual criminals or
it will be deemed discriminatory.
" Note, Wyatt v. Stickney-A Constitutional Right to Treatment for the Mentally Ill, 34 U.
PnTt. L. REV. 79, 83 (1972).
' Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956). This case denies the states the power to
imprison the physically ill. However, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), does permit
a state to compel hospitalization for such a person.
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Therefore, since there are mentally ill people whose hospitalization with-
out treatment amounts to imprisonment," equal protection is denied
within the class of ill people. It is argued that the only possible way to
avoid such an allegation of imprisonment is to afford treatment to those
mental patients involuntarily confined. A similar argument was unsuccess-
fully presented to the Supreme Court in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court17 in which appellant contended that the Supreme Court of
Minnesota had denied him equal protection of the laws by construing a
state statute dealing with "psychotic personality" to be limited to persons
who like himself could not control their sexual impulses." Commenting on
appellant's contention the Court stated that "[t]he argument proceeds on
a view that that statute has selected a group which is a part of a 'larger
class'."" The Court went on to say that:
The question, however, is whether the legislature could constitutionally make
a class of the group it did select. That is, whether there is any rational basis
for such a selection. . . .Whether the legislature could have gone further is
not the question. The class it did select is identified by the state court in
terms which clearly show that the persons within the class constituted a
dangerous element in the community which the legislature in its discretion
could put under appropriate control. . . . [Tihe legislature is free to recog-
nize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of
cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. If the law 'presumably'
hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there
are other instances to which it might have been applied. 0
Under such an analysis alone a right to treatment based on equal
protection creteria will not stand. It can be argued that while the class of
"ill people" is broader than mere mentally ill people, it is the mentally ill
who pose a threat to society as potentially dangerous individuals and who,
therefore, are in need of compulsory confinement and treatment.
A stronger equal protection argument, however, can be advanced.
Such an argument suggests that a person acquitted of a crime by reason
of insanity must not be confined for a period of time longer than the period
allowed had he been convicted of the offense charged. 7' A longer term
" See note 22 supra.
.7 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
" 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939).
" 309 U.S. at 274.
711 Id.
7 In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), the court held that both prisoners and non-
prisoners have a right to a jury trial and judicial hearing before being committed to a mental
hospital.
It has been contended that Baxstrom's mandate for equal protection can:
also be applied to the case of the patient who was committed to the mental hospital
for a period of time greater than he would have had to serve in prison had he been
convicted of the crime and received the maximum sentence therefore.
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would have to be imposed for a stated purpose-i.e., treatment and reha-
bilitation, if it were to be justified within an equal protection framework."
Therefore, equal protection of the law may require that mental patients
receive psychiatric treatment, but only to the extent necessary to remedy
the disparity in confinement between convicted criminals and unconvicted
mental patients charged with identical crimes.
COURT ORDERS TO PROVIDE TREATMENT
In this period of inflation and governmental freezing of monies ear-
marked for domestic spending, one cannot speak of enforcing a constitu-
tional right to treatment without inquiring into how such enforcement is
to be financed and whether the courts can or should compel reluctant
legislatures to appropriate adequate funds for such treatment. One very
important question which must be asked is whether a state can afford not
to treat its mental patients or to treat them at an inadequate level. Studies
have shown that the longer a patient goes untreated the longer he will
remain "hospitalized" and the greater will be the cost to the state.73
The Rouse" and Wyatt7 5 decisions declared that inadequate treatment
Flaschner, Florida's New Mental Health Law, 46 FLA. B.J. 344, 348-49 (1972).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50(3) (McKinney 1973) offers protection to those confined
because they lacked capacity to stand trial in that such a person may not be retained for a
period in excess of "two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of imprisonment for the
highest class felony charged in the indictment or for the highest class felony of which he was
convicted."
71 See In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614, 617-18 (1970). The case deals with the disparity
of treatment as to confinement between juvenile and adult offenders who have been convicted
of the same offense.
Comparisons between the right to treatment of juvenile offenders and mental patients is
justified. One writer sees
[cilose parallels between juvenile proceedings and psychiatric proceedings. Both in-
volved deprivation of liberty; both were civil rather than criminal; in both, the ostensi-
ble purpose was treatment, not punishment; both created stigma; both involved aber-
rant behavior.
ENNIS, supra note 2, at 186.
"3 An enormous amount of tax money is consumed in building and operating mental hospi-
tals. In the fiscal year 1970-71, New York State spent almost $600 million for its public mental
health hospitals and schools for the retarded; the amount was far from adequate. Yet it is
not only more money that is needed but also a more sensible allocation of what we have. New
York spends about $18 per day for each state hospital patient; Iowa spends about $50 (the
national average is about $15). In the long run, however, the taxpayers in Iowa spend a lot
less per patient than do the taxpayers in New York. With its higher expenditure, Iowa, unlike
New York, is able to hire enough psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and
paraprofessionals to give each patient an active treatment program. Consequently, the aver-
age period of hospitalization in Iowa is fifteen days, compared to the New York average of
sixty days. Fifteen days at $50 per day ($750) is much cheaper than sixty days at $18 per
day ($1,080). ENNIS, supra note 2, at 222-23.
71 373 F.2d at 457.
71 325 F. Supp. at 784.
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cannot be justified by a lack of finances. However, such a "declaration is
far different from an order to the state that it must take affirmative action
to provide funds. Judicial financing orders have been only rarely entered
against government entities."7 6 Generally, when a court finds an adminis-
trative agency such as a department of mental health neglectful of its
duties, the court first gives the agency itself a chance to rectify the situa-
tion. However, where there has been a deprivation of constitutional
rights," as in the school desegregation cases,78 courts have acted swiftly to
issue financing orders or compel other remedial measures. Until recently,
however, courts have been reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of
state mental hospitals 0 and prison systems." Such intervention is neces-
sary if state legislatures are to be moved to action. That is why, prior to
the Wyatt decision, Birnbaum had lamented: "unfortunately, it seems a
fact of life that few legislatures will take it upon themselves to deal with
this problem (of adequately financing mental hospitals) unless the Su-
preme Court (or any federal court) recognizes a constitutional right to
treatment. "I
It has been suggested 83 that due to a similarity of problems,84 courts
attempting to enforce the right to treatment should look to the school
11 Drake, supra note 24, at 606. The author of this article served as associate counsel to the
plaintiffs in Wyatt. See Comment, Enforcement of Judicial Financing Orders: Constitutional
Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 GEO. L. J. 393 (1970).
11 Although the Wyatt court found that neglect by the Alabama Department of Mental
Health had amounted to deprivation of the patient's constitutional rights, nonetheless it
granted the state six months to correct conditions in its mental institutions. 325 F. Supp. at
705.
71 See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (the Court compelled Prince
Edward County, Virginia, to maintain a desegregated school system by ordering the county
to levy a special tax to finance its schools); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (the
Supreme Court ordered immediate desegregation of city parks). In both cases, the Supreme
Court, despite a lack of available funding, took immediate action to protect constitutional
rights which otherwise would have been circumvented.
7' As an example of another somewhat "drastic" judicial remedy consider the forced busing
of school children to attain racial balance in the schools. Busing could be categorized as an
indirect financing order.
" Wyatt is actually the first case in which an entire mental hospital was opened to judicial
inspection. Such a wholesale evaluation of the system can be credited to the use of a class
action. See note 38 supra.
" In Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), the court ordered the renovation of
the entire Arkansas prison system so that it would function within constitutional guidelines.
' Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752, 765 (1969).
See Note, Guaranteeing Treatment for the Committed Mental Patient: The Troubled
Enforcement of an Elusive Right, 32 MD. L. REV. 42, 68 (1972).
" Courts lack the manpower and expertise to continuously supervise school desegregation
and/or mental health plans without aid. They are therefore somewhat dependent on the
cooperation of the same agencies who are often defendants in these cases. Also, a court may
discover that a master plan for all mental hospitals cannot be formulated, thus making each
case dependent on its own facts and circumstances.
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desegregation cases for equitable guidelines. The Supreme Court in Green
v. County School Board,5 established the test for judicial inspection of
proposed school desegregation plans: "The availability . . . of other more
promising courses of action may indicate a lack of good faith, and at least
it places a heavy burden upon [those submitting plans] to explain
[their] preference for an apparently less effective method.""6 This test
could readily be adapted to a mental hospital improvement plan. Coopera-
tion may prove difficult to secure, but the courts now seem willing to
appoint masters 7 or professional advisory committees where needed to
oversee the reformation of mental hospital systems. 81
What specifics would be included in an order to provide funds or take
other affirmative steps? The Wyatt decision has given very definite guide-
lines. These include: (1) a request for legislative cooperation with the
threat of court-supervised administration of the facility in case of non-
compliance;"5 (2) minimum constitutional standards for the creation of a
humane psychological and physical environment; 0 (3) requirement for the
employment of a qualified staff in sufficient numbers to administer ade-
quate treatment; 91 and (4) requirement for the introduction of individual-
ized treatment plans.2 This scheme includes provisions for extended peri-
ods of grace for an administrative agency that has shown a good faith
attempt to comply with the minimum standards," but has, as of yet, not
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
' Id. at 439.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) permits the appointment of a master to administer
an institution such as a mental hospital if an "exceptional condition" exists. It has been
contended that the need to devise standards of care that are constitutionally adequate for
mental hospitals is such an "exceptional condition." Drake, supra note 24, at 598.
" While the Wyatt court did not take such measures, on rehearing, it did threaten to inter-
vene if court-ordered minimum constitutional standards were not implemented voluntarily.
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (dealing with Bryce Hospital); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (dealing with Parlow State School and Hospital for the retarded).
" 344 F. Supp. at 378.
" The Wyatt decision offered detailed descriptions of what constitutes adequate physical
facilities (e.g., one toilet per eight patients) and an adequate psysical plant (e.g., the tempera-
ture in the hospital is not to drop below 68°F nor exceed 83°F.). For a discussion, see note 19
supra and accompanying text.
11 A qualified staff means: each professional employee shall be duly licensed and certified by
the state; non-professional staff shall be oriented in clinical techniques; and the hospital must
comply with staffing ratios (e.g., four registered physicians, two phychiatrists, twelve nurses
(RN), four psychologists (one Ph.D; one M.A.; and two B.S.'s), and ten patient activity aides
per 250 patients). 344 F. Supp. at 383-84.
" Some of the requirements of an individualized treatment plan are: a comprehensive mental
and physical examination within two days of admission; a formulation of intermediate and
long range therapeutic goals; specified staff responsibilities for achieving such goals; criteria
for discharge; formulation of a post-hospitalization plan; continuous review of treatment
plans; and educational opportunities suitable for each patient. Id. at 384-86.
11 A court can only order an institution to comply with minimum standards. "[Djue process
requires no more than minimal adequate treatment." 32 MD. L. REv. at 67.
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fully conformed. 4
Although Wyatt ordered the state legislature to take affirmative steps
to improve the treatment and living conditions at state hospitals, the court
did not, directly order the legislature to spend a specified sum of money
to make the required improvements to its institutions." One possible fin-
ancial remedy, requested by the plaintiffs in Wyatt but on which the court
reserved ruling until a future date," is an order to the state mental health
board to sell or otherwise encumber some of its land holdings (if such exist
in excess) so as to raise additional money for treatment programs. This
proposal is a desperation measure which could only have short term and
short-lived benefits.
A second means of obtaining funds to assist those mental patients
most in need of treatment would be to secure a judicial order releasing all
patients who are deemed to be "untreatable" and non-violent.17 This tech-
nique will alleviate the funding problem only if those released receive
either public out-patient or private care. If the patient's release is in fact
a transfer to another type of public institution then the cure is specious.
For example, it was requested by the Wyatt plaintiffs that the court order
the transfer of 1600 geriatric patients, most of whom suffer senility alone,
to public or private old age homes. Funds for their care would then be
provided not from state mental hospital appropriations but from other
public sources such as the Alabama Department of Pensions and Secu-
rity.9 Unless it can be shown that departments such as Pensions and
Security have unused, earmarked funds or that treatment in old age homes
would be better, such a proposal is a weak solution to the monetary prob-
lem for ultimately it is the same pie, state taxpayer dollars, that is being
sliced, only in a slightly different fashion.
A third method for counteracting legislative intransigence would be
the implementation of a judicial policy requiring that all patients who are
being denied treatment in mental facilities be released"' if compliance with
325 F. Supp. at 785.
Traditionally, the courts are reluctant to order relief in an area or manner which would
appear to be reserved for state legislative action. However, where fundamental rights are at
issue, the courts will mandate either the reallocation or the expenditure de novo of public
funds. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F.
Supp. 316, 320 (D.V.I. 1970) (fundamental constitutional rights "may be neither denied nor
abridged solely because their implementation requires the expenditure of public funds.").
344 F. Supp. at 377.
'7 See note 7 supra.
' Drake, supra note 24, at 598.
For the criteria upon which such releases would be based see text accompanying notes 37
& 38 supra. In Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), the court warned that if
Arkansas wanted a prison system, the state must run it within constitutional guidelines. The
case seems to imply that if funds are not available to keep the prison system within minimum
constitutional standards, the prison system will be closed down. The results of such drastic
action are incomprehensible. In all likelihood, funds would be forthcoming before such a step
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minimum constitutional standards is not forthcoming by a date certain.
Such a threat might be called "judicial blackmail" but it would undoubt-
edly place great political pressure on state legislatures to finance treatment
programs.
Still a fourth avenue of approach is illustrated by recent court deci-
sions"n"' awarding monetary damages to mental patients against a state and
its mental hospital officials for denying these patients treatment while
confining them in state mental facilities. In effect, legislatures would be
faced with a choice of appropriating funds for treatment now or paying
damages later.
Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals believes
that court financing orders and other judicial pressure tactics are unworka-
ble and ill-advised. He has suggested the use of "judicial muckraking" to
dramatize the plight of mental patients in the eyes of the public:
Courts cannot force legislatures to provide adequate resources for treatment.
But neither should they play hand-maiden to the social hypocrisy which
rationalizes confinement by a false promise of treatment. Quite the contrary,
courts should and must reveal to society the reality that often festers behind
the euphemism of 'hospitalization'. Some might call this judicial muckrak-
ing. But courts fulfill a necessary function when the drama and publicity
attending a concrete case provide the illumination of dark recesses which is
essential if society and its legislatures are to make informed judgments.''
A RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
The Wyatt Court has declared that mental patients have a right to
treatment. Does such a right include a right to refuse treatment? Or, does
a constitutional right to treatment have attached to it a duty to submit to
treatment? The answer to this question is not easily susceptible to general-
ization since the type of treatment proposed for a given patient may influ-
ence one's judgment. Nevertheless, answers to these questions have been
phrased in absolute terms by some commentators.
Dr. Thomas Szasz is perhaps the most outspoken advocate of the right
to refuse treatment.10 He states that involuntary hospitalization of the
mentally ill is a crime against humanity and is comparable in several
respects to the institution of slavery.' °0 In his view, the only way to insure
that those who do not wish to submit to treatment can make such a choice
was necessary. The same threat is applicable to state mental health facilities which are not
being run within minimum constitutional guidelines.
See, e.g., Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742, 749 (1969).
" See T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY (1970); id., PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965); id., THE MYrH
oF' MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
I'l T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY. (1970).
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is to eliminate the system of involuntary commitment in its entirety. 104 In
its place Dr. Szasz at least with respect to the aged mentally ill would seek
legislation to compel families to care for their "mentally ill" members
much the same as parents are forced by the state to provide care for their
children."" Even assuming an abundance of good will, this proposal is
quixotic. Most families do not have the money, the expertise, or the time
to care for their own mentally ill. 16
The opposite extreme is represented by those who see the forced treat-
ment of psychiatric patients as a necessary evil. 107 Their theory is based
on a paternalistic evaluation which credits mental patients with, at best,
the intellect of a child in need of schooling: "Since the attitude of distrust
which leads a patient to refuse treatment is often a manifestation of the
mental infirmity which requires treatment, in most cases the patient could
not be considered competent to decide for or against treatment."''0
After all, it is argued, a constitutional right, i.e., the right to treat-
ment, can only be waived through intentional relinquishment of a known
right."" We must ask may we repose such responsibility in a mental
patient? A recent New York case, Whitree v. State,"10 persuasively argues
that we cannot. In Whitree the court denounced a hospital staff for having
deferred to the wishes of a mental patient who had refused treatment."'
1114 Let those who want the state to do all kinds of things for the aged pursue their goal
as they see fit. But every hour they spend planning "services" for the aged, let them
spend two guaranteeing them the right not to receive but to reject these benefits. The
first step in this direction is, of course, clear and simple: the immediate abolition of
all involuntary psychiatric intervention imposed . . .by the state.
Comment, Symposium on the Aging Poor, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 45, 82 (1972).
Id. at 84-85.
"" Dr. Szasz' answer is that the problem is moral. We do not involuntarily confine the
helpless newborn. Why do we confine the helpless aged? This argument ignores such emotions
as the joy in life renewed-the infant-and the fear of life diminished-the aged.
,o7 See, e.g., K. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF (1938).
The importance of consent as an element in the overall receptivity of a patient to treat-
ment has been recognized by medical and legal authorities. See Gilboy & Schmidt,
"Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 429 (1971). "Making the
patient responsible for his own treatment, rather than committing him forcibly to an institu-
tion, is said to increase his feelings of self worth and his receptivity to psychiatric treatment."
Id., citing Klatte, Lipscomb, Rozynks & Pugh, Changing the Legal Status of Mental Patients,
HOSPITAl. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, July, 1969, at 29-32.
'll Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment-A Constitutional Right to Treatment, 23 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 125, 133 (1972).
'" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
We find that [Whitreel was not treated with any of the modern tranquilizing drugs
.. . [T]he reason for not using such drugs was that Whitree refused them. We
consider such reason to be illogical, unprofessional, and not consonant with prevailing
medical standards.
Id. at 707, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
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The spectrum of treatment offered to this patient had been limited to a
choice of drug therapy or no therapy at all. The court found that the
operative facts rather than supporting a right to refuse treatment required
an award of damages to the patient. Whitree's refusal of therapy had
condemned him to 14 years of such substitute tranquilizers as beatings and
isolation."2
There are those who advance the right to refuse treatment on constitu-
tional grounds." ' Various arguments are presented: a first amendment
right to privacy of the mind;' a fourth amendment right to be let alone;"'
and a fourteenth amendment right to substantive due process."' However,
these rights are no more compelling than the right to liberty, a right that
is eviscerated every time a patient is involuntarily committed. The state
could argue that just as a mentally ill person does not recognize the danger
he poses to himself or others and is therefore confined against his will, so
too, he is unable to recognize or consent to his need for treatment.
Another seemingly plausible argument for advancing the right of the
state to compel mental patients to accept treatment is based on the power
of the state to protect its treasury. If a mentally ill person could be admit-
ted to a state hospital, treated for his infirmity, and released, the state
would be in a more favorable economic position than if it were forced to
later provide for his indefinite retention and custodial care.
However, in Shapiro v. Thompson,"7 the Supreme Court struck a
Connecticut statutory requirement limiting welfare benefits to state resi-
dents despite the argument that the statute was for the protection of the
state treasury. The Court reasoned that no compelling state interest was
served by the status of "state resident" as a criterion for receiving welfare
benefits. The restriction served merely to impede the fundamental right
of interstate travel." ' In light of Shapiro, it seems unlikely that the "right
11. Id. at 704, 710, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 498, 499, 504.
See Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "De-
molish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 616, 661-64 (1972).
"I Id. at 661-62 quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1968): "Whatever the power
of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts."
" See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): "The
makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id. at
478.
"I The state would be compelled to show a substantial government interest coupled with a
means that offers a minimal interference with the right to private "thought process"-if such
a right were deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, any interference would be unconstitu-
tional as a violation of substantive due process. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies
Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 So. CAL.
1. REV. at 664, relying on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
' Id. at 629-31.
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to be let alone" could be circumvented by a desire to preserve state monies.
What then is the right of a mental patient deemed in need of treat-
ment? Must he submit to it or has he a right to refuse it? It seems clear
that a middle course must be charted. In certain circumstances treatment
must be left entirely to the discretion of medical experts. The spectre of
the Whitree alternatives presents too recent, and too compelling, an an-
swer to the accusation of paternalism. In cases where the patient's condi-
tion indicates-and this must be both a medical and legal judgment-that
he can make an informed decision as to treatment, then at the very least
hospitals should be required during the term of confinement to attempt to
convince him that treatment will be beneficial. "The constitutional right
to treatment would seem to require that . . .attempts at rehabilitative
treatment continue for as long as the patient is detained.""' This approach
bases the right to refuse treatment upon a decision as to the competency
of a patient and the adequacy of his guidance by counsel. 2 " Those patients
possessing the ability to consent 121 to, or to waive treatment should be
" 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 134.
"-" New York State already has a system under which lawyers, as a part of the Mental Health
Information Service, are attached to the State's four judicial departments and made available
to mental patients as a means of protecting their rights while they are hospitalized under
voluntary or involuntary proceedings. The statutory framework of New York's system pro-
vides in pertinent part that:
The Mental Health Information Service in each judicial department of the state shall
perform the following duties subject to directions made and rules and regulations
promulgated by the presiding justice of the appellate division of each department:
1. study and review the admission and retention of all patients.
2. inform patients and, in proper cases, others interested in the patients' welfare
concerning procedures for admission and retention and of the patients' rights to have
judicial hearing and review, to be represented by legal counsel, and to seek indepen-
dent medical opinion.
3. in any case before a court, to assemble and provide the court with all relevant
information as to the patient's case, his hospitalization, his right to discharge, if any,
including information from which the court may determine the need, if any, for the
appointment of counsel for the patient or the obtaining of additional psychiatric
opinion.
4. provide services and assistance to patients and their families and to the courts
having duties to perform relating to the mentally disabled, or the allegedly mentally
disabled, who are admitted pursuant to articles thirty-one, thirty-three and thirty-five
of this chapter, as may be required by a judge or justice thereof and pursuant to the
regulations of the presiding justice of the appellate division of each judicial depart-
ment.
N.Y. MENT. HYC,. L.§ 29.09(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). These lawyers
could be used to aid competent mental patients in making an informed consent or waiver of
possible therapies.
12 21 C.F.R. § 130.37(h) (F.D.A. Regulation) (1973): 'Consent' means that the person in-
volved has legal capacity to give consent, is so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, and is provided with a fair explanation of pertinent information concerning the
Itreatmentl. ...
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permitted to do so; those patients unable to make decisions 2 ' would have
to rely on the judgment of qualified psychiatrists. In both cases legal advice
and independent psychiatric examinations should be provided as a further
safeguard, in an attempt to ascertain whether or not a patient possesses
the ability to make an informed consent or waiver.'2 3
In concluding this section it will be profitable to focus upon particular
types of treatment which have recently been challenged in the courts and
which put into issue the right to refuse treatment. Sanders v. Brennan,124
a suit brought against the United States Department of Labor, sought to
put an end to patient labor in mental facilities. Doe v. Department of
Mental Health 2 has challenged the use of certain surgical procedures to
correct mental disorders. These cases should be viewed in light of the
preceding arguments supporting the right to refuse treatment. Sanders was
instituted in the United States District Court in Washington, D.C. by the
National Association for Mental Health, the American Association on
Mental Deficiency, and three mental patients. These plaintiffs alleged
that thousand of mental patients in non-federal hospitals are being com-
pelled to perform menial jobs with little or no compensation for their work.
Two of the most common defenses for such labor are: first, that the work
is therapeutic,'2' and secondly, that such labor helps defer part of the cost
of hospitalization.'27 The District of Columbia plaintiffs have apparently
122
How does one obtain consent from a severely ill catatonic schizophenic who could not
even give the time of day much less consent to treatment or from a paranoid inmate
whose refusal of treatment is a product of his illness? How does one obtain informed
consent from a inmate placed in the institutional setting because he was not competent
to stand trial or from a sociopath who is by his nature generally uncooperative?
45 So. CAl.. L. REv. at 673,
'1:' The argument can be raised that the cost of such a procedure would be prohibitory.
However, the right to treatment is fundamental and cannot be justified by a lack of funds.
"There can be no legal (or moral) justification for . . . failing to afford treatment.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
"' Index # 482-73 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Wash. D.C.).
Habeas Corpus # 19434 (Circuit Courts for the County of Wayne, Mich.).
' The term used to describe an institutional system wherein patients perform various labors
and are compensated for such work with money or other mediums of exchange is "token
economy." It is a behavioral therapy technique whereby good behavior of a patient (such as
helping to maintain the cleanliness of the ward he or she resides in) is rewarded and, there-
fore, encouraged by giving the patient a "token" which can be used as a medium of exchange
for purchasing meals and cigarettes, or can be cashed in for real money. See T. AYLLIN & N.
ARZIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968).
In Patton State Hospital, California, such a "token economy" has proven effective as a
therapeutic device. The readmission rate of Patton patients who took part in the experiment
is approximately sixteen percent while the national readmission rate is somewhere between
35 and 40%. H. SCHAEFER & P. MARTIN, BEHAVIORAL THERAPY 216 (1969). For an in-depth
discussion of the legal consequences of a "token economy" see Wexler, Token and Taboo:
Behavior Modification, Token Economies, and the Law, 61 CAUF. L. REV. 81 (1973).
12 N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1973, at 21, cols. 4-5.
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challenged the first defense on the grounds that minimally compensated
or uncompensated labor is not therapeutic and is, in fact, harmful. How-
ever, a resolution of the issues raised in the case may be reached without
passing upon the validity of the claimed therapeutic value of work. Assum-
ing, arguendo, that the labor involved is therapeutic, it would seem from
earlier arguments" that competent patients under the guidance of counsel
should nevertheless, be allowed to choose whether or not to participate in
such therapeutic labors. In fact, Judge Johnson in Wyatt specifically ad-
dressed himself to the question of patient labor and categorically declared
that, even absent the concept of informed waiver, "[n]o patient shall be
required to perform labor which involves the operation and maintenance
of the hospital. .... ,,2 Such work, is permissible, however, if patients
volunteer to participate provided their salaries are not applied toward
financing their stays in the hospital.30 In addition such labor is to be
compensated in accordance with the minimum wage laws. 3' In light of
Wyatt, it would appear that plaintiffs' cause of action against the Depart-
ment of Labor has judicial support.
Doe v. Department of Mental Health,'3 brought in the Wayne County
Circuit Court of Michigan, was commenced by a civil liberties lawyer on
behalf of the patients of Ionia State Hospital to either strictly control or
totally ban the class of treatment known as "psychosurgery"' 3 3 which is
used to "cure" mental patients. It is feared by civil libertarians-both
doctors and lawyers-that "psychosurgery" may be used as an "easy way
out" instead of applying "conservative psychotherapy" techniques. 34
"Psychosurgery's proponents argue that this procedure might be the only
hope for a 'cure' for some mental patients."' 35 The case presents a conflict
of rights situation. A patient identified only as John Doe has requested
that such therapy be used on him; if the plaintiffs win their suit John Doe
might be denied the treatment he has requested.30
' See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
' 344 F. Supp. at 381.
Id.
Id., see 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1966). Accord, N.Y. MENT. HYva. L. § 15.09 (McKinney Supp.
1972).
'3 Habeas Corpus #19434 (Cir. Court for the County of Wayne, Mich.).
"Psychosurgery" is defined as a:
Technique by which tiny portions of tissue deep in the brain are destroyed through
surgery, electicity, radiation or ultrasound . . . to treat such conditions as uncontrolla-
ble epilepsy, violent behavior, schizophrenia, severe depression and destructive hyper-
activity.
N.Y. Times, March 12, 1973 at 1, col. 7.
Id. at 25, col. 1.
'I Id.
' More recent reports in the New York Times have indicated that the three-judge Wayne
County Circuit Court panel has ruled that John Doe was being unconstitutionally held in that
the statute under which he was convicted was itself declared unconstitutional (N.Y. Times,
19 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1973
It would appear that John Doe's constitutional right to treatment
would, granting that his consent was informed, 31 give him the right to
choose "psychosurgery" unless it be established that such treatment is
medically unsound.
The Wyatt decision supports arguments for "psychosurgery" by per-
mitting lobotomies and other unusual therapy techniques when the patient
has given his informed consent. 3 8 It is doubtful that "psychosurgery" could
be constitutionally administered against a patient's wishes. Such action
would violate a patient's "right to be let alone.' ' 3 However, it is also
doubtful that "psychosurgery" can be denied when requested by a patient
capable of giving informed consent.
CONCLUSION
It is now established that mental patients have a constitutional right
to treatment. Moreover, the courts can take affirmative steps to bring the
care provided by state hospitals up, to at the very least, minimum consti-
tutional standards when the institutions themselves are slow or reluctant
to provide care for the mentally ill. However, more must be done if the
right to treatment is to become enforceable.
Many state legislatures have yet to codify the right to treatment.
Without such codification, plaintiffs must rely solely on constitutional
arguments in an attempt to obtain that to which they have a right and yet
have been denied. When state statutes are not silent on the right to treat-
ment, treatment is more likely to be forthcoming. And, as has been seen,
a statutory right to treatment affords the courts an easier handle to grasp
in awarding damages and/or ordering treatment than the yet weakly de-
fined constitutional grounds on which to base such decisions. But, without
accompanying public concern, legislatures will remain inert, continuing to
ignore the shackling of mental patients who are in quest of treatment and
eventual release.
Until such time as legislatures, motivated by public prodding, put the
right to treatment into law, the courts will have to continue to push deeper
into this constitutional frontier. "The drama and publicity attending a
concrete case"'' 40 will define the right to treatment in a usable framework.
Case law must establish the "who," "what," "when," "where," and
Mar. 25, 1973, at 65 col. 1); that John Doe has now changed his mind and no longer wants to
undergo psychosurgery (N.Y. Times, April 5, 1973, at 26 col. 1); and that John Doe has
subsequently been released (N.Y. Times, April 10, 1973, at 24 col. 1). However, although John
Doe no longer desires to attempt a psychosurgery cure, the question still has importance as
to whether or not a patient has a right to request psychosurgery.
: See note 116 supra.
344 F. Supp. at 380.
' See note 110 supra.
"" See note 97 supra.
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"why," of a patient's right to treatment-and of his right to refuse treat-
ment. Hopefully, as the courts define and enforce these rights on a case
by case basis, "judicial muckraking" will pierce the public conscience and
stimulate debate and change on a statewide basis. For, if the one out of
ten Americans"' now alive who will someday be mental patients are to be
given a decent chance to return to society, it must be the other nine who
are moved to demand that help be forthcoming.
